The West’s insistence that Ukraine not use its equipment on Russian territory is self-defeating at best, negligent at worst…
Not allowing Ukraine to launch direct attacks on Russia is prolonging the war.
Disallowed
Have you ever considered the following? That forcing Ukrainians only to attack Russian-held Ukrainian territory, rather than Russia itself, the West is effectively saying; here are our weapons, but you can only use them if you force yourself into an expected, direct attack on entrenched Russian forces, thereby greatly increasing the likelihood of incurring massive loss of life and the conflict being drawn out.
An appropriate Ukrainian response: Can’t we just go around the side— avoiding Russia’s defence lines — just as the German’s did with France’s Marginot line at the beginning of WWII?
Again, the West: No. Good luck!
By the West setting the requirement to not attack Russian territory, Russia can today effectively leave its direct border with Ukraine undefended. Doing so allows them to concentrate more forces to defend from the Ukrainian counter-attack in the East. But imagine if there was no such limit on how and where Ukranian’s could attack Russia? Russia would be forced to build heavy defence lines along its entire border with Ukraine, consuming far more resources and manpower than the limited defence lines they maintain today.
Besides, isn’t attack the best form of defence? Heading straight onto Russian territory in an unexpected location, would leave the enemy scattered. Said attacks would also make the local Russian people feel the war a lot more closely, placing more political pressure on the Putin regime to withdraw. But what of the added risk of doing so? The risk of causing ‘WWIII’ through direct attacks on Russian territory using US (or Western) equipment is, frankly, speculation. There is nothing to clearly delineate how doing so would be worse than what is happening today or, say, worse than the imminent supply of fighter jets and long-range missiles.
Continued risk
Comparatively, the risk of a meltdown at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP), on-going massive loss of Ukrainian and Russian life and of Russia using a tactical nuclear warhead on Ukrainians, just becomes higher as the war continues. To that end, there’s an argument that ending the war sooner through more aggressive action is the less risky decision.
In the case of US armaments deployed on Russian territory, it’s worth bearing in mind that such an act is easy to deny by US and Western allies. The West could easily claim ignorance or simply blame Ukrainians for going against their wishes (while continuing to support them).
Surprise-attack
Belgorod has already proven not to be well defended, as the recent front opened by the Freedom of Russia Legion demonstrates. As shown in the image above, Russia does not expect a direct attack and so only limited defences have been built along the real border with Ukraine in the North. It seems that absolutely no defence lines have been built closer to Kiev.
One strategy is to loop around the Northern most tip of the Russian defence lines, through the Belgorod Oblast, and down into the occupied territories in Luhansk, allowing the Ukrainian army to rout the Russians from behind. Pincer movements could be orchestrated where frontal attacks are combined with the rear offensive. The action could be continued southwards into Zaporizhzhia.
Such a manoeuvre would not only be unexpected, it would lead to much faster progress and less loss of life than simply charging head-on. Routing the Russians in the North, then working southwards from the rear, perhaps even all the way into Kherson, could collapse Russian forces completely. All Ukrainian effort could then be concentrated on the border with Crimea, making a quick victory there more likely too.
Alternatively or in parallel, Ukrainians could simply occupy border regions in Russia such as Kursk. Why not? Again, doing so would drive home the war to the local Russian population. It would force Russians to re-direct resources to that region, taking them away from the frontlines in Ukraine. When direct invasion by the actual Ukrainian army is observed, even more political pressure on Putin to withdraw from the conflict will be created.
Admittedly, the use of tactical nuclear warheads by Russia could be more likely in the latter’s case. However, their use in the current conflict is in no way off the table as it is. And the West making clear the very real prospect of retaliation in such a scenario would mitigate the prospect.
In fact, the most risky situation today (potentially worse than a tactical nuclear warhead) is a scenario in which the ZNPP is destroyed. Such sabotage by Russian forces (evidence of potential sabotage in now well documented) would not actually affect Ukraine and Russia as badly as imagined; prevailing winds are likely to shift the radiation across most of Europe pretty swiftly. Ending the war sooner would reduce the likelihood of that occurring. In any unexpected counter-attack as outlined above, ZNPP should be quickly secured by Ukrainian forces.
History of war
Treaties on war as well as a study of great victories won indicate that the use of surprise, misdirection and speed generally ends well for the attacker (or defender). Sun Tsu has shared his experience here but a study of Roman victories (as well as losses to Hannibal) and Germany’s blitzkrieg in WWII also support the premise. As does Ukraine’s initial counter-offensive which left Russia completely wrong-footed.
What could run a real risk of another world war is directly deploying NATO troops to the front lines or supplying Ukraine with tactical nuclear warheads. However, I believe even that would not result in retaliation from Russia, and essentially through ending the war almost instantly, will lower the overall risk to global security.
Conclusion; the West needs to the lift its restrictions on the use of the weaponry it supplies to Ukraine to defend itself. Doing so will open up countless more opportunities for Ukraine to surprise and confuse its enemy. And ultimately will lead to a shorter war with less loss of life. Every day not doing so compels Ukrainian troops into more line of fire than they deserve.
